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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
v. 
DANIEL LEE KEENER : Case No. 20070485-CA 
Defendant/Appellant : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a judgment of conviction for one count of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-3 /'-Ki I n a)(iii) (2002); ..;, : - ? - f; w: m°erment 
of a. < ' i miiu degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
112.5 (2003), in the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred .;u»n ih:>«'. >n: 
pursuant - . ""x^-,-^ -,• .^ r
 L See Addendum A (Judgment and 
Conviction). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: 1 i denying Mr. Keener's motion to suppress the 
search warrant where the search warrant contained intentional or reckless misstatements 
and uncorroborated hearsay statements and failed to establish probable cause requiring 
the warrant u> i . ^uppiessed under bmli Ihe fedend and slate eonstiti itions. 
Standard of Review: When reviewing whether the search warrant supported by 
affidavit has been issued with an adequate showing of probable cause, this Court 
"review[s] the district court's assessment of the magistrate's probable cause 
determination for correctness and ask[s] whether the district court erred in concluding 
that the magistrate had a substantial basis for [his] probable cause determination." State 
v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, [^14, n.2, 48 P.3d 872; see State v. Babbel 770 P.2d 987, 991 
(Utah 1989). This Court "should consider [the] search warrant affidavit 'in its entirety 
and in a common-sense fashion.'" Babbell, 770 P.2d at 991 (citations omitted). The 
magistrate's decision should be given "'great deference.'" Id. (citations omitted). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant, Daniel Lee Keener, preserved his argument that the search warrant 
supported by affidavit containing omissions and misstatements lacked an adequate 
showing of probable cause atR. 60-88; 108-09; 121-66; 167-171; 221; 222. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text of the following constitutional provisions are determinative of the issue 
on appeal: U.S. Const, amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I, §14. The text of these provisions is 
located in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 20, 2005, Keener was charged by Information with one count of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and unlawful 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 1-3. On July 13, 2006, a 
preliminary hearing was held where Keener was bound over. R. 39-40. The trial court 
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granted the state's motion to amend the Information. R. 39-40. The state amended the 
Information, charging Keener with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute, a third degree felony, two counts of endangerment of a child or elder 
adult, both third degree felonies, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor. R. 41-43. On July 14, 2006, the state filed a second amended 
Information, charging an additional count of endangerment of a child or elder adult. R. 
44-46. 
On August 23, 2006, Keener filed a motion to suppress evidence from the search 
of his residence on the basis that the search warrant was invalid because the affidavit 
used in support of the warrant contained intentional or reckless misstatements and lacked 
probable cause for the search. R. 60-88. A copy of the affidavit is attached as 
Addendum C. The state filed a memorandum in opposition to Keener5s motion to 
suppress. R. 89-102. On October 11, 2006, a suppression hearing was held in the matter. 
R. 108-09; 221. The court invited the state to submit a supplemental memorandum 
addressing Keener's argument made under Utah's Constitution. R. 110-120; 221:48-49. 
The court allowed Keener the opportunity to respond to the state's supplemental 
memorandum. R. 121-166; 221:49. On November 8, 2006, the trial court issued its 
decision denying Keener's motion to suppress. R. 167-71. A copy of the trial court's 
memorandum is attached as Addendum D. 
On March 12, 2007, Keener entered into a conditional plea for unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and endangerment of a child 
or elder adult, both third degree felonies. R. 204; 222. Keener reserved the right to 
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appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. R. 222:2. On May 4, 2007, the 
trial court sentenced Keener to two indeterminate terms not to exceed five years on both 
counts, consecutive. R. 210-12. The prison terms were suspended and Keener was placed 
on probation for 36 months. R. 210-12. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 20, 2005, the stated charged Keener by Information with unlawful 
possession of a controlled substance and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. R. 1-
3. After the preliminary hearing, the Information was amended, charging Keener with 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a third degree 
felony; three counts of endangerment of a child or elder adult, third degree felonies; and 
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 44-46. The 
amended charges were based on a probable cause statement set forth in the Information: 
The written report of Salt Lake [C]ity Police Officer D. Teerlink that 
on December 9, 2005, he assisted in the service of a Search Warrant [at] 
that home [of] defendant Daniel Lee Keener, located at 849 North Sir 
Phillip Drive, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
A search of the defendant's bedroom revealed scales, and large 
quantities of marijuana. 
The defendant's two minor children, A.R.K. (DOB 1/23/95) and 
E.M.K. (DOB 1/26/96) live at the residence with the defendant. J.B., 
(DOB 2/12/03) was also present in the home. Marijuana was located in the 
defendant's bedroom next to his child's crib. 
The statements of the defendant that he gives marijuana to relatives. 
R.46. 
Keener filed a motion to suppress challenging the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant. R. 60-88. Keener argued that the affidavit lacked sufficient probable cause to 
allow the issuance of a search warrant in violation of the federal and Utah constitutions. 
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R. 60-88. Specifically, Keener argued that the affidavit was based on misinformation as 
it referred to the informant as a "concerned citizen" rather than an individual 
apprehended while trying to pawn a stolen ring, failed to disclose the informant's 
criminal history, and failed to corroborate the informant's allegations. R. 60-88. 
The affidavit prepared by Detective Doug Teerlink stated in relevant part 
the following: 
Your affiant is a Salt Lake City Police Officer and has been a police officer 
for over 5 years. Your affiant is currently assigned to the Salt Lake City 
Police Department's Narcotic Unit and investigates narcotic related 
offenses. Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and in the 
investigation of narcotic related offenses through the Utah Police Academy 
and the California Narcotics Association. Your affiant's specialized 
training includes the DEA Clandestine Laboratory Course. Your affiant 
has worked street level drug interdiction as an arresting officer and as an 
undercover police officer. Your affiant has seen several different types of 
narcotics during these operations. Your affiant has been involved with over 
400 drug related cases, many of which were felonies. 
Within the last 6 hours your affiant has received information from a 
concerned citizen named Gary Lambson. Mr. Lambson stated that there is 
stolen jewelry at the address of 849 North Sir Phillip Drive. He also stated 
that the individuals who reside or otherwise occupy 849 North Sir Phillip 
Drive are engaging in an ongoing narcotics distribution operation. 
On 12/6/05 Mr. Lambson met with Daniel V. Keener for the purpose of 
buying jewelry. Daniel V. Keener traveled with Mr. Lambson to 849 North 
Sir Phillip Drive. Mr. Lambson was told that this was Daniel V. Keener's 
son's residence. The son is named Daniel Lee Keener. Inside the residence 
Daniel V. Keener retrieved a bag of jewelry. Mr. Lambson said the bag 
contained rings, necklaces, watches and bracelets. Mr. Lambson purchased 
a ring for $50 from Daniel V. Keener. Mr. Lambson said Daniel V. Keener 
put some of the jewelry in his pocket and left most of the jewelry in the bag 
at the listed residence. 
While in the residence of 849 North Sir Phillip Drive, Mr. Lambson 
observed the following items on a table in the back room; two large bags of 
marijuana and a triple beam scale. He said one of the bags contains chronic 
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marijuana. Chronic is high quality marijuana. The other bag contains 
lower grade marijuana. Mr. Lambson said that Daniel Lee Keener is selling 
the marijuana out of the listed residence. 
On 12/8/05 Mr. Lambson took the ring he purchased to Mike's Custom 
Jewelry and Repair at 254 East 6400 South for the purpose of selling it. 
The clerk at Mike's Jewelry recognized the ring as the one that belongs to 
another employee of Mike's Jewelry named Julie Baker. Mrs. Baker 
identified the ring to be a custom made ring that was stolen out of her 
vehicle along with other jewelry on 11/5/05 at 145 West Pierpont Avenue 
(Salt Lake City case number 05-193011). The police responded to Mike's 
Jewelry and questioned Mr. Lambson. 
Your affiant showed Mr. Lambson the list of Jewelry stolen during the 
previously mentioned vehicle burglary. Mr. Lambson identified a yellow 
and white gold diamond ring and a Blue turquoise stretch bracelet as items 
he saw in Daniel V Keener bag of jewelry at the listed residence. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the concerned citizen 
to be accurate and reliable because: 
The concerned citizen, Gary Lambson, has provided your affiant with his 
name, date of birth and criminal history. Your affiant informed Mr. 
Lambson that if he gave your affiant any false information he would be 
charged with interfering with an investigation. 
Your affiant has checked police and state records and found that Daniel V. 
Keener has been arrested numerous times for Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, the most recent arrest was on 5/5/2002. He was also arrested for 
Carrying a Loaded Fire Arm in a Vehicle on 6/30/89. Your affiant has also 
found that Daniel Lee Keener's drivers license shows the address of 849 
North Sir Phillip Drive. Daniel Lee Keener has been arrested for numerous 
thefts including an Aggravated Burglary on 02/26/2000, numerous drug 
charges (the most recent on 05/12/05) and Strong Arm Robbery. 
Your affiant desires to enter 849 North Sir Phillip Drive and search for 
stolen jewelry, marijuana, marijuana paraphernalia and other items related 
to the distribution of marijuana. The paraphernalia includes such items as 
pipes, bongs or tubes used to inhale or smoke marijuana. Other related 
items include packaging material used to package marijuana and scales 
used to weigh quantities. Your affiant knows from training and experience 
that these items are almost always found on the premises where search 
warrants for controlled substances have been executed. 
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Your affiant desires to search for records of stolen jewelry and marijuana 
sales, both written and electronic, residency papers and U.S. currency. 
Your affiant knows from past experiences with narcotic investigations that 
persons sometimes record their sales to show dates, amounts purchased and 
drug indebtedness. Your affiant knows from training and experience that 
stolen jewelry and marijuana is sold for U.S. currency. The concerned 
citizen purchased the stolen ring with U.S. currency. 
This application for search warrant has been reviewed and approved for 
presentation to the court by Deputy District Attorney Blake Hills. 
R. 79-81; see Addendum C. Another affidavit in support of a search warrant for the 
residence of Daniel V. Keener, Appellant's father who occupied a different residence 
than Appellant, was prepared by another detective, Michael Hardin, on the same day as 
the affidavit at issue in this case.1 R. 82-88; see Addendum E. In the affidavit prepared 
by Detective Hardin, the detective described the informant, Gary Lambson, as an 
individual "who was detained by Murray Police, concerning a stolen ring." R. 83. 
During the motion to suppress hearing, the judge asked Detective Teerlink if these two 
"affidavits [were] submitted to Judge Atherton simultaneously?" R. 221:26. The 
detective answered, "Yes, they were." R. 221:26. 
Keener argued that the court could not look beyond the four corners of the 
affidavit applicable to this case in determining whether probable cause existed in support 
of the search warrant issued for Appellant's residence. R. 221:14-15. In denying 
1
 During the motion to suppress hearing, the state objected to references made to the 
affidavit prepared by Detective Hardin stating, "I'm going to object to anything regarding 
a different search warrant for a different case in a different instance referred by a 
different detective. It had no bearing in relation to this case that we're here on today." R. 
221:6. 
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Keener5 s motion to suppress, the trial court found "no misstatement" in the affidavit 
stating the following: 
Had Detective Teerlink's affidavit stood alone, his characterization of 
Lambson as a "concerned citizen" would be troubling to the court. But it 
did not stand alone; rather, it was submitted alongside Detective Hardin's 
affidavit, which pointed out that Lambson had been "detained by Murray 
Police" regarding "a stolen ring." Hardin Affidavit, p. 2. That reference in 
Detective Hardin's affidavit, combined with Detective Teerlink's 
knowledge that Judge Atherton would be reviewing both his and Detective 
Hardin's affidavit together, dispelled any potential false impression. It is as 
if the detectives defined "concern citizen" to mean Gary Lambson, a person 
of interest detained by authorities. 
R. 169. The trial court then concluded "that Judge Atherton 'had a substantial basis for 
determining that probable cause existed and that evidence of illegal conduct would be 
found at the' Sir Phillip Drive location." R. 169. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's denial of Mr. Keener's motion to suppress was erroneous where 
an examination of the four corners of the detective's affidavit upon which the search 
warrant was issued demonstrates that it was insufficient to support a finding of probable 
cause to search Mr. Keener's residence. The evidence in this case shows that the 
detective intentionally or reckless misinformed the magistrate regarding the status of the 
informant, characterizing him as a "concerned citizen" rather than a criminal informant 
thereby materially misrepresenting his reliability. 
The informant was being held in police custody for his suspected role in the theft 
of a ring that was stolen from a vehicle when he gave information to the detective 
concerning alleged criminal activity at Mr. Keener's residence. Although the detective 
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was aware of the circumstances under which the informant gave this information and its 
impact in lessening the reliability of that information, the detective failed to accurately 
inform the court in his affidavit of these circumstances. Even if it were possible for the 
court to look beyond the four corners of the affidavit to establish probable cause, the 
evidence does not support the judge's finding that the affidavit in this case presented by 
Detective Teerlink was read simultaneously by the magistrate with the affidavit presented 
by a different detective concerning a different defendant, different residence and different 
case when making her finding of probable cause or that the magistrate made any 
connection between the two affidavits. Therefore, the trial court's finding was clearly 
erroneous. Additionally, the evidence also demonstrates that the detective omitted 
material information regarding the informant's criminal history and failed to corroborate 
the details of the informant's allegations of criminal activity. 
Because the detective's material misstatements and omissions were intentionally 
or recklessly false and the affidavit otherwise fails to establish probable cause the fourth 
amendment was violated and the evidence should have been suppressed. However, even 
if probable cause did exist, article I, section 14 of Utah's Constitution requires the 
evidence be suppressed where misstatements and omissions have been intentionally or 
recklessly made to the court in order to secure a search warrant. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. KEENER'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE SEARCH WARRANT WHERE THE 
WARRANT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE BUT 
BASED ON AN AFFIDAVIT CONTAINING INTENTIONAL OR 
RECKLESS MISINFORMATION AND UNCORROBORATED HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "[t]he right of 
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const, amend IV. The text of 
article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution contains identical language. Utah Const, art. 
I, § 14-
In considering whether an affidavit supporting a search warrant gave the 
magistrate a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause, Utah courts "' examine the 
search warrant affidavit "in its entirety and in a common-sense fashion," deferring to the 
magistrate's decision on whether the search warrant is supported by probable cause.55' 
State v. Dable, 2003 UT App 389, f 4, 81 P.3d 783 (quoting State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 
515, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted)). However, this Court has also stated 
that it is "bound by the contents of the affidavit, [and] need not defer to the trial court's 
finding." Id.(quotation and citation omitted); see also State v. Deluna, 2001 UT App 401, 
•J 9, 40 P.3d 1136 (noting that a Utah appellate court, "like the reviewing court below, is 
bound by the contents of the affidavit. . . [and] make[s] an independent review of the 
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trial court's determination of the sufficiency of the written evidence"). In other words, 
although this Court may defer to the magistrate's determination of probable cause, the 
analysis on appeal is limited to the four corners of the affidavit in question, and this Court 
owes no deference to the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. Id.; Whiteley v. 
Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 565 n.8 (1971). 
A search warrant based on an affidavit in support thereof "must articulate 
particularized facts and circumstances leading to a conclusion that probable cause exists. 
Mere conclusory statements will not suffice." State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d at 990. The 
standard requires sufficient evidence to support "ca fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 
1303, 1304 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). 
A review of the magistrate's probable cause determination will "assess whether the 
magistrate had a '"substantial basis' for determining that probable cause existed." State 
v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, TJ14, 48 P.3d 872 (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1259-60 (Utah 1993) (further quotations omitted)). "[T]he magistrate can only fulfill his 
constitutional function if the information given to him is true." State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 
188, 190 (Utah 1986) ("[T]he obvious assumption behind the warrant requirement is that 
the factual showing to support a finding of probable cause will be truthful."). 
In challenges to the sufficiency of an affidavit based on an informant tip, the Utah 
Supreme Court has adopted the same standard that is applied under federal law; namely, 
the "flexible totality-of-the-circumstances standard" articulated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213 (1983). State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, Ijll, 104 P.3d 1265 (citations omitted). 
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Under that analysis, Utah courts consider whether an affidavit contains detailed relevant 
facts concerning the informant and the alleged criminal conduct. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 
239; Babbell, 770 P.2d at 990-91; Droneburg, 781 P.2d at 1304-05. 
Factors to consider in determining whether probable cause exists 
include an informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge. Gates, 
462 U.S. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at 2329; State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 
(Utah 1987); State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 
some cases, the circumstances may require the supporting affidavit to set 
forth in detail the basis of knowledge, veracity and reliability of a person 
supplying information in order to establish probable cause. State v. Bailey, 
675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984). In other cases, if the circumstances as a 
whole demonstrate the truthfulness of the informant's report, a less strong 
showing is required. Id. at 1205-06. For example, reliability and veracity 
are generally assumed when the informant is a citizen who receives nothing 
from the police in exchange for the information. See Bailey, 675 P.2d at 
1206; Brown, 798 P.2d 286; State v. Stromberg, 783 P.2d 54, 57-58 (Utah 
App. 1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Courts have also 
consistently approved the issuance of search warrants where the informant's 
knowledge is based on personal observation. See Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130; 
Brown, 798 P.2d at 287; Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57. Further buttressing 
reliability is the detail with which an informant describes the facts set forth 
in the affidavit and independent corroboration of the significant facts by 
police. See TState v.l Anderson, 701 P.2d [1099,] at 1102 [(Utah 1985)]; 
Bailey, 675 P.2d at 1206; Brown, 798 P.2d at 287. 
Purser, 828 P.2d at 517; see also. Saddler, 2004 UT 105, Tjl 1 ("The indicia of veracity, 
reliability, and basis of knowledge are nonexclusive elements to be evaluated" in totality 
of the circumstances analysis (abrogating the Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) three factor analysis in determining reliability and sufficiency of an 
informant). 
In the present case, the trial court concluded that "[h]aving reviewed Teerlink's 
Affidavit in its entirety, . . . Judge Atherton 'had a substantial basis for determining that 
probable cause existed and that evidence of illegal conduct would be found at the' Sir 
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Phillip Drive location." R. 169. In concluding that probable cause existed, the trial court 
determined that the question of whether an "'an intentional misstatement in an affidavit 
supporting a warrant,'" material or otherwise '"requires suppression of the evidence' 
under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution" was left open because it found that 
"no misstatement" was made by the detective. R. 169. In finding that no misstatement 
had been made by the detective, the trial court looked beyond the four corners of the 
Teerlink affidavit and noted that "[h]ad Detective Teerlink's affidavit stood alone, his 
characterization of Lambson as a 'concerned citizen' would be troubling to the court. But 
it did not stand alone; rather it was submitted alongside Detective Hardin's affidavit 
[submitted to secure a search warrant of a different residence of a different individual], 
which pointed out that Lambson had been 'detained by Murray Police' regarding 'a 
stolen ring.' Hardin Affidavit, p.2." R. 169. The trial court determined that the reference 
to Lambson in Detective Hardin's affidavit "combined with Detective Teerlink's 
knowledge that Judge Atherton would be reviewing both his and Detective Hardin's 
affidavits together, dispelled any potential false impression. It is as if the detectives 
defined 'concerned citizen' to mean Gary Lambson, a person of interest detained by the 
authorities." R. 169. 
An examination of the four corners of the affidavit in question reveals that it was 
insufficient to support a finding of probable cause to search Mr. Keener's residence 
because Detective Teerlink intentionally or recklessly (A) misinformed the magistrate 
2
 The trial court stated in a footnote that "a finding that the Sir Phillip Drive warrant was 
constitutionally permissible under a state constitutional analysis necessarily means that it 
was permissible under a federal constitutional analysis too." R. 169 n.3. 
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regarding the status of the informant relied upon and failed to adequately corroborate the 
informant's allegations of criminal activity; (B) omitted material information regarding 
the informant's criminal history and (C) such intentional or reckless misstatements and 
omissions require suppression of the evidence where they are material and the affidavit 
otherwise failed to establish probable cause. The trial court's finding relying on 
information outside the four corners of the affidavit was erroneous. Even if it were 
permissible for the trial court to look beyond the four corners of the affidavit when 
evaluating whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause, 
the information relied upon by the trial court in making its finding is not supported by the 
evidence. Because the detective's material misstatements and omissions were 
intentionally or recklessly false and the affidavit otherwise fails to establish probable 
cause, the evidence must be suppressed. 
A. The Affidavit Failed to Support a Finding of Probable Cause Because it 
Contained an Intentional or Reckless Material Misstatement 
Characterizing Lambson as a "Concerned Citizen," Thereby 
Misrepresenting the Reliability of the Informant, and Failed to 
Corroborate the Details of the Alleged Criminal Activity. 
The supreme court explained in State v. Nielsen, that "[t]he responsibility for 
issuing warrants and for meeting the pertinent constitutional requirements that underlie 
their issuance rests with the magistrate,. . . [but] the magistrate can only fulfill his 
constitutional function if the information given to him is true." 727 P.2d 188, 190 (Utah 
1986). For this reason, "[a] law enforcement officer must be aware not only of the need 
for accuracy in the information provided to a magistrate in support of an application for a 
search warrant, but also of the importance of absolute truthfulness in any statements 
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made under oath." Id. at 191. Additionally, "courts must be particularly vigilant in 
assessing a claim that a police officer has misrepresented information in an affidavit 
supporting the issuance of a search warrant." Id. at 190-91 (emphasis added). 
In this case, the trial court erred when it concluded that Detective Teerlink's 
affidavit provided a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause because it wrongly 
characterized Mr. Lambson as a "concerned citizen," omitted material information 
regarding the informant's criminal history, and failed to corroborate the details of the 
informant's allegations of criminal activity. The trial court's factual finding that "no 
misstatement" existed as Teerlink's affidavit "did not stand alone" but "was submitted 
alongside Detective Hardin's affidavit" is erroneous because it is not supported by the 
evidence and looks beyond the four corners of the Teerlink affidavit to support probable 
cause.3 R. 169. 
3
 "
c[F]actual findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to 
suppress evidence' are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard." State v. 
Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, \\ 1, 100 P.3d 1222 (further quotation and citations omitted). 
However, in Deluna, this Court stated that it is bound on review "by the contents of the 
affidavit," and it will not defer to the trial court's findings in support of its denial to 
suppress. 2001 UT App 401, *|{9, 40 P.3d 1136. Under the four corners rule limiting 
review to the contents of the affidavit alone, the affidavit fails to establish probable cause. 
Similarly, under the clearly erroneous standard, the evidence fails to support the trial 
court's finding that the magistrate reviewed the affidavits together to "dispel[]" the false 
information conveyed establishing probable cause. R. 169. Appellant argues that under 
the circumstances of this case, involving a judge made finding, the marshaling rule 
should not be implicated. Rather, the standard employed is whether the finding is against 
the clear weight of the evidence. Weighing evidence to determine whether the evidence 
is against the clear weight of evidence involves a different review standard than 
marshaling the evidence and considering it in the light most favorable to the finding. In 
other words, considering whether a finding is against the clear weight of the evidence 
requires reviewing all of the evidence, without weighing it in favor of the finding, and the 
finding can be against the clear weight of evidence, even if the marshaled evidence would 
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On December 9, 2005, Detective Teerlink submitted an affidavit to Judge 
Atherton stating in part that he had "received information from a concerned citizen 
named Gary Lambson. Mr. Lambson stated that there is stolen jewelry at the address of 
849 North Sir Phillip Drive. He also stated that the individuals who reside or otherwise 
occupy 849 North Sir Phillip Drive are engaging in an ongoing narcotics distribution 
operation." R. 79. Detective Teerlink stated in the affidavit that he "considered] the 
information received from the concerned citizen to be accurate and reliable because: 
The concerned citizen, Gary Lambson, has provided your affiant with his 
name, date of birth and criminal history. Your affiant informed Mr. 
Lambson that if he gave your affiant any false information he would be 
charged with interfering with an investigation. 
R. 80. 
At the motion to suppress hearing, Detective Teerlink testified that he prepared the 
search warrant for Mr. Keener's residence, 849 North Sir Phillip Drive. R. 221:22. The 
detective testified that he became involved in this investigation after 
Detective Hardin[ ] contacted me and explained that he had a - that there 
was a gentleman that he had in custody at the time, Mr. Lambson; and he 
said that he had a residence that had some—told me that there were some 
drugs there, some stolen jewelry, and asked me for my assistance. 
R. 221:22. The detective believed he was contacted for his help because he "had 
experience in writing search warrants and experience in narcotics." R. 221:23. 
Detective Teerlink testified that he interviewed Mr. Lambson at the Salt Lake City Police 
Department. R. 221:23. The detective stated that the only thing he "promised [Mr. 
support the finding. See State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). Although 
marshaling the evidence seems contrary to a weight of evidence review, with an 
abundance of caution, Appellant nevertheless marshals the evidence for this Court. 
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Lambson was] that if he lied to me in any way about the investigation, . . . I would charge 
him for false information and interfering in an investigation." R. 221:23. The detective 
testified that no other promises were made to Mr. Lambson but stated 
Mr. Lambson was detained that evening while the search warrant - until 
after the search warrant was served. I contacted Detective Hardin[ ] and 
suggested that since I had put his name - Mr. Lambson's name in the 
search warrant, that it would not be a good idea to book him into jail with 
the same people that he was - that he'd given us information on. Then I 
suggested that we - 1 suggested later to him that we not file charges. 
R. 221:24. 
The detective testified that he used Mr. Lambson5 s name in the affidavit because 
"without his name in the search warrant, it - I didn't feel like we had enough probable 
cause, and that we needed his name to make him - you know, if we just said an 
anonymous informant, then it would not be - we didn't have enough probable cause. R. 
221:25. The detective testified that he used the term "concerned citizen" rather than 
"confidential informant" "because he was not signed up as a confidential informant. 
[He'd] never done any buys with him. [He] hadn't made any promises to him." R. 
221:25. The detective testified that he used the term concerned citizen because he did not 
feel Mr. Lambson fit the guidelines normally used for confidential informants. R. 
221:26. On cross-examination, the detective admitted that he knew that informants 
termed as "concerned citizens" were accorded more reliability than those termed criminal 
informants. R. 221:26. The detective stated his intent was to put Mr. Lambson in a "box 
that seemed to fit him in my mind." R. 221:30. 
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The trial judge then asked the detective whether "the affidavits [were] submitted to 
Judge Atherton simultaneously?" R. 221:26. The detective said "Yes, they were." R. 
221:26. This single question by the judge was the only evidence presented in support of 
the trial court's finding that Detective Teerlink's affidavit did not stand alone. R. 169. 
This affirmation of the judge's question does not support the trial court's finding that 
Detective Teerlink had "knowledge that Judge Atherton would be reviewing both his and 
Detective Hardin's affidavits together, dispel[ing] any potential false impression." R. 
169. Detective Teerlink did not testify that he knew that the affidavits were in fact read 
simultaneously or that the affidavits cross referenced each other to establish probable 
cause, only that he presented his affidavit at the same time Detective Hardin presented his 
affidavit regarding another defendant in another case. There is no evidence that these 
affidavits were given alone by each detective or with multiple other affidavits as is the 
common practice when seeking search warrants. Presumably when different officers 
present different affidavits dealing with different defendants and cases, a busy magistrate 
is not necessarily going to connect the two affidavits together. In fact, the magistrate 
could have been presented with a number of other affidavits at the same time and there is 
no evidence that the magistrate did in fact make any connection between the two 
affidavits in question here. The state did not present any further evidence regarding the 
affidavit submitted by Detective Hardin dealing with facts from a different case. Notably, 
both the state and defense counsel argued during the suppression hearing that references 
to the affidavit prepared by Detective Hardin "regarding a different search warrant for a 
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different case in a different instance referred by a different detective" had no bearing on 
this case. R. 221:6. 
The marshaled evidence, therefore, does not support the judge's finding that the 
affidavit in this case, presented by Detective Teerlink, was read simultaneously by the 
magistrate with the affidavit presented by Detective Hardin concerning a different 
defendant, different residence and different case when making a finding of probable 
cause. And, the judge's finding that the affidavit was not misleading because Detective 
Hardin's affidavit was presented at the same time is against the weight of the evidence 
that shows that the officer intentionally or reckless used a more reliable informant label 
so as to pass the probable cause test. Furthermore, reliance on information outside the 
four corners of the affidavit is improper. Case law firmly establishes that probable cause 
must be established based on the contents of the affidavit itself. Saddler, 2004 UT 105 at 
1fl7; Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at | 9 . 
In this case, the affidavit prepared by Detective Teerlink used to secure the search 
warrant of Appellant's residence, intentionally or recklessly misinformed the magistrate 
about the informant's status, which bore on his reliability and omitted material 
information regarding the informant's criminal history, thus failing to support a finding 
of probable cause. The detective's testimony regarding his knowledge that by terming 
Mr. Lambson a "concerned citizen" the court would consider the information more 
reliable together with his admission that he did not believe that probable cause could be 
established by omitting Mr. Lambson's name from the affidavit, thus not even meeting 
the reliability of a confidential informant, demonstrates the detective's intentional or 
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reckless intent to mislead the court. However, even if this Court determines that the 
detective's misstatements were unintentionally or not recklessly made, the affidavit still 
fails to establish probable cause because the information obtained came from a criminal 
informant rather than a "concerned citizen," thus lowering the reliability of the hearsay 
statements, and the detective failed to independently corroborate the informant's 
allegations of criminal activity. Therefore, the evidence should be suppressed. 
1. The detective's intentional or reckless misstatements bore on the 
informant's reliability materially affecting the affidavit. 
When probable cause to search is predicated upon facts supplied by an informant, 
part of the totality of the circumstances analysis includes determining the type of tip or 
informant involved. State v. Dable, 2003 UT App 389, Tf6, 81 P.3d 783. There are two 
primary types of informant: the citizen-informant and the police informant (sometimes 
called a criminal or confidential informant). Generally, "an ordinary citizen-informant 
needs no independent proof of reliability or veracity." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at ^14 
(citations and quotations omitted). A citizen-informant is "an average citizen who is in a 
position to supply information by virtue of having been a crime victim or witness" and 
relates the information to the police as a matter of civic duty. State v. White, 851 P.2d 
1195, 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quotations and citations omitted); see also State v. 
Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805, 822 (Neb. 1999) ("citizen informant... is a special status which 
must be affirmatively alleged"); United States v. Mahler, 442 F.2d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 
1971) (stating that when the informant is the victim of the crime, no other facts are 
necessary to show that informant is reliable). 
20 
Alternatively, a police informant is one "who gains information through 
involvement in criminal activity or who is motivated by pecuniary gain [and thus] is 
lower on the reliability scale." State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, |^ 31, 996 P.2d 555 
(internal quotations and citation omitted); see also State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 789 
(Minn. 1999) (noting that "statements from citizen witnesses, as opposed to criminal 
informants, may be presumed to be credible"); State v. Williams, 193 S.W.3d 502, 507 
(Tenn. 2006) (noting the difference in reliability "between information provided by 
'citizen' or 'bystander5 informants and information provided by 'criminal informants' or 
an informant from a 'criminal milieu'" (citation omitted)). "Thus, experienced stool 
pigeons or persons criminally involved or disposed are not regarded as 'citizen-
informants' because they are generally motivated by something other than good 
citizenship." See People v. Smith, 553 P.2d 557, 560 (Cal. 1976) (citation omitted). "The 
designation 'citizen-informant' is just as conclusionary as the designation 'reliable-
informant.' In either case the conclusion must be supported by facts stated in the 
affidavit." Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, an anonymous tip is "toward the low-end of 
the reliability scale" because the tipster's "basis of knowledge and veracity are typically 
unloiown." Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citation 
omitted) (abrogated on other grounds in Saddler, 2004 UT 105). On the other hand, 
informants, who "give their full names, thus subjecting themselves to a penalty for 
providing false information," are more reliable than those who remain anonymous. 
Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at [^15. 
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In determining whether an informant is a citizen-informant or police informant, it 
is important to consider whether the informant was part of the criminal environment, 
which would lower his reliability. See State v. Goldberg, 872 A.2d 378, 383 (Vt. 2005) 
("Our cases attaching a presumption of reliability to named citizen informants expressly 
distinguish between citizens who simply come forward in the interest of law 
enforcement, and informants who have a preexisting relationship with the police."). 
Another consideration in determining the informant reliability is whether the informant 
provided information against his penal interest. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 
583 (1971) (holding statements "against the informant's penal interest" "carry their own 
indicia of credibility")). 
When an affidavit is based primarily on information obtained from an informant, 
the supreme court has recognized that 
[A]n informant's "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are but two 
relevant considerations, among others, in determining the existence of 
probable cause under "a totality-of-the-circumstances." They are not strict, 
independent requirements to be "rigidly exacted" in every case. A 
weakness in on or the other is not fatal to the warrant so long as in the 
totality there is a substantial basis to find probable cause. 
Saddler, 2004 UT 105, Ifl 1, 104 P.3d 1265. Factors looked at when evaluating the 
sufficiency of an affidavit based on information given by an informant are any 
corroborating details, statements against penal interest, participation in criminal activity, 
and personal observations made by the informant. Id. at ^ 5. 
In Saddler, the supreme court held under the totality of the circumstances present 
the "affidavit set[] forth sufficient underlying circumstances to support the reliability and 
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credibility of the confidential informant and [the detective's] corroborative efforts." 2004 
UT 105 at Yfl6, 27. Even though this affidavit set forth sufficient details to bolster the 
confidential informant's reliability, including the informant's statements against his penal 
interest and personal observation, the court noted that "even if the confidential 
informant's reliability were in question, this would not necessarily be fatal to the warrant 
under the totality-of-the-circumstances standard." Id. at ^ 1 8 , 21, 26. An affidavit based 
on an anonymous informant can support a finding of probable cause where the police are 
"able to corroborate" "the detailed information" given. Id In Saddler, the detective 
detailed his "significant" corroborative efforts in the affidavit in addition to "verifying] 
other, more innocent details provided by the confidential informant" such as the vehicles 
present at the home, the vehicles registered owners, and Saddler's place of employment. 
Id. at ffij 18-19, 22, 24. 
An examination of these factors outlined above demonstrates that the affidavit in 
this case was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause because Mr. Lambson 
was not an inherently reliable informant. For example, Mr. Lambson was not a 
"concerned citizen" who came to the police with information about criminal activity "as a 
matter of civic duty," (State v. White, 851 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)) or 
otherwise, thus, giving his statements an indicia of reliability requiring "no independent 
proof of [their] reliability or veracity." Deluna, 2001 UT App 401 at ^14. Instead, Mr. 
Lambson was detained for possession of a ring that was stolen from a vehicle. R. 168. 
Mr. Lambson had taken the ring purchased for $50 from Daniel V. Keener, Appellant's 
father, to a jewelry store and had attempted to sell it. R. 79, 168. And Mr. Lambson was 
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in police custody for his suspected role in the theft of the ring at the same time Detective 
Teerlink was seeking a search warrant based on information from Mr. Lambson, but 
depicting Mr. Lambson as a concerned citizen. 
Detective Teerlink asserted that Gary Lambson was an accurate and reliable 
source because he provided "his name, date of birth, and criminal history." R. 80. While 
such information may bolster the reliability of an informant under some circumstances, 
here Mr. Lambson provided his information and information regarding the stolen jewelry 
and drugs at a time when he was under investigation for criminal conduct relating to the 
incident and when in police custody. Accordingly, he is not entitled to the presumption 
of reliability normally afforded to citizen informants with no connection to the police. 
See State v. McArthur, 2000 UT App 23, If 31, 996 P.2d 555 (noting that an "informant 
who gains information through criminal activity . . . is lower on the reliability scale than 
a citizen informant'5); see also United States v. Button, 653 F.2d 319, 326 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(noting that "courts should be cautious in accepting the assertion that one who apparently 
was present when narcotics were used or displayed is a presumptively reliable citizen-
informer. . . . because as a general proposition it is an informant from the criminal milieu 
rather than a law-abiding citizen who is most likely to be present under such 
circumstances"). 
Furthermore, given the circumstances under which Mr. Lambson's provided his 
statements, they cannot be considered statements against his penal interest, thus 
increasing his reliability, because they did not subject him to any additional criminal 
liability greater than what he was facing. Saddler, 2004 UT 105 at TJ20. In fact, his 
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statements were aimed at lessening his criminal culpability and the sanctions he faced. 
For example, in State v. Spillers, 847 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 2006), the Supreme Court of 
Indiana held that an informant's statements that his cocaine supplier was Spillers and he 
had recently purchased cocaine from him were not statements against his penal interests 
and did not bolster the informant's reliability. Id. at 954-57. The criminal informant in 
Spillers had been arrested for dealing or possession of cocaine as a result of a search 
warrant being executed on his home. Id at 951-52. After his arrest, the informant told 
detectives that Spillers was his drug source and had recently obtained cocaine from him 
earlier that same day. Id. at 952. The informant also gave information regarding 
Spillers5 girlfriend's address where he was staying and the make and model of his car. 
Id. Spillers moved to suppress the evidence arguing that the affidavit was insufficient to 
establish probable cause for a search warrant because the informant's credibility had not 
been established nor had the statements been corroborated. Id. at 953. The state argued 
that the informant's statements were not only corroborated but were made against his 
penal interests. Id. 
The court determined that unlike those cases where "an informant, after arrest or 
confrontation by police, admitted committing criminal offenses under circumstances in 
which the crimes otherwise would likely have gone undetected" the informant here "was 
caught "c red-handed'" with drugs in his possession before naming his purported 
supplier." Id. at 956. "Although [the informant] admitted committing additional crimes 
of possession of cocaine, his tip was less a statement against his penal interest than an 
obvious attempt to cuny favor with police." Id (citing Williamson v. United States, 512 
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U.S. 594, 607-08 (1994) ("A person arrested in incriminating circumstances has a strong 
incentive to shift blame or downplay his own role in comparison with that of others, in 
hopes of receiving a shorter sentence and leniency in exchange for cooperation.")). 
Therefore, the informant's statement was not a declaration against his penal interest 
demonstrating his credibility because he had already been arrested for possession and 
"his decision to reveal his source to police did not subject him to any additional criminal 
liability.55 Id. at 957. 
Similarly, in this case Mr. Lambson was not inherently reliable because he was 
detained for trying to sell a stolen ring and subject to possible third degree felony 
charges.4 The information he gave the detectives about Mr. Keener did not subject him 
to additional criminal liability. Nor did the threat of being charged for giving false 
information, a class B misdemeanor, increase his reliability. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
506 (2003); Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 957 n.8. (dismissing the state's argument that if the 
informant had been found to have given false information he could have been prosecuted, 
concluding that because the informant had been "arrested for either a Class A or a Class 
C felony, his potential criminal liability for an additional misdemeanor offense was de 
minimus55). Furthermore, the detective was acutely aware of the circumstances under 
which Mr. Lambson was giving information about the stolen jewelry and drugs and its 
impact in lessening the reliability of that information, yet he failed to accurately inform 
4
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (2003), Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, states in part 
"A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another 
knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen. . . .55 Theft is 
a third degree felony if the value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is 
less than $5,000. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412. 
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the court. The detective was also aware that categorizing Mr. Lambson as a "concerned 
citizen" rather than a criminal informant would make him appear more reliable. The 
detective's intentional or reckless misstatements regarding Mr. Lambson's informant 
status bore on the reliability of the hearsay statements, materially affecting the affidavit. 
However, even if this Court determines that these statements were not made 
intentionally or recklessly, Mr. Lambson's statements were unreliable and could not 
support a finding of probable cause. Although Mr. Lambson's unreliable statements 
could not have stood alone, it may have been possible for his allegations to support a 
finding of probable cause, if they had been adequately corroborated by independent 
police investigation prior to the issuance of the search warrant. See Saddler, 2004 UT 
105 at f 21. However, in this case the affidavit still lacked probable cause because, as set 
forth below, Detective Teerlink failed to properly corroborate Mr. Lambson's allegations. 
2. The affidavit fails to support a finding of probable cause where the 
detective failed to independently corroborate the unreliable hearsay 
statements. 
Because Detective Teerlink did not independently confirm any illegal activity, the 
informant's tip in this case was not properly corroborated and therefore the affidavit was 
insufficient to justify a search of Mr. Keener's residence. When an affidavit is based 
primarily on a tip from an informant, Utah courts "expect police officers to make 
significant independent corroborative efforts to confirm the information." State v. 
Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332, «|[15, 37 P.3d 260. Moreover, the United States Supreme 
Court has explained that the police must corroborate the allegations of criminal activity, 
not merely an informant's description of a suspect's appearance or residence: 
27 
An accurate description of a subject's readily observable location and 
appearance is of course reliable in [a] limited sense: It will help the police 
correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse. Such a tip, 
however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of concealed 
criminal activity. The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip 
be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a 
determinate person. 
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000); see also United States v. Clark, 31 F.3d 
831, 834 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the "[m]ere confirmation of innocent static 
details in an anonymous tip does not constitute corroboration"). 
For example, in United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2005), six 
affidavits were submitted seeking six search warrants of the defendant's different 
residence where defendant was suspected of dealing drugs from. IcL at 530. The sixth 
affidavit (the Frazier affidavit), seeking to search defendant's Jeffries Street residence, 
described the defendant's criminal enterprise and gave the report of an anonymous 
witness "CW-1" who had personally witnessed defendant selling drugs out of the housing 
project. Id. The Frazier affidavit did not include information regarding the activities 
caught on tape with a different confidential informant (CI-178) that the other five 
affidavits had included. Id, No substantial corroboration of the anonymous witness CW-
1 statements were made by the agent. Id. The defendant moved to suppress the Frazier 
affidavit based on lack of probable cause, which was granted. Id. 
The court reiterated established case law that when reviewing the "sufficiency of 
the evidence supporting probable cause [it] is limited to the information presented in the 
four-corners of the affidavit" and therefore "may not consider in this analysis [the 
agent's] testimony that CI-178 recorded the [drug] transactions" because the Frazier 
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affidavit did not include the information. Id. at 531. The court noted that as part of its 
totality of the circumstances analysis it must consider the confidential informants 
veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge. 
While independent corroboration of a confidential informant's story is not a 
sine qua non to a finding of probable cause, in the absence of any indicia of 
the informants' reliability, courts insist that the affidavit contain substantial 
independent police corroboration. 
Id. at 532 (citations omitted). The court noted that the agent failed to include any 
evidence of corroboration of the informant information or evidence of the confidential 
informant's reliability. Id. Because none of the informants' statements were corroborated 
other than observations that Frazier was "coming and going from his residence on Jeffries 
Street" "and a search of his telephone records reveal[ing] that he was in constant contact 
with known drug dealers," the court concluded that the district court correctly suppressed 
the Frazier affidavit. Id. at 532-33. 
State v. Detroy, 72 P.3d 485, 488 (Haw. 2003), also shows that when an 
informant's statements are low on the reliability scale, substantial independent 
corroboration must be done by the officers in order to establish probable cause. In 
Detroy, a detective received an anonymous tip that described the location of the 
defendant's residence and alleged that he "may [have been] growing marijuana there." 
Id. The informant claimed that he had smelled "the odor of marijuana plants" and had 
"observed through [defendant's open windows, in the room that contained an air 
conditioner, a very bright white light. . . . [and] the tops of marijuana plants." Id The 
informant also provided a physical description of the suspect. Id. Upon independent 
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investigation, however, the detective only "ascertained that (1) [informant's description 
of the apartment and windows was accurate, (2) [informant's description of [defendant 
substantially matched the computer information he accessed, and (3) lights could be 
observed throughout the apartment except for the room with the air conditioner." Id. at 
492. The Hawai'i Supreme Court noted that the detective "was unable to verify the 
incriminating aspects of the tip. [The detective] failed to (1) detect the odor of marijuana 
plants, (2) observe bright lights in [defendant's back room, [or] (3) see the tops of 
marijuana plants in [defendant's apartment." Id. Therefore, the court concluded that "to 
the extent corroborated, the tip did not provide probable cause." Id 
Additionally, in State v. Goldberg, 872 A.2d 378, 380 (Vt. 2005), further 
demonstrates that uncorroborated information from a unreliable criminal informant does 
not establish probable cause. In Goldberg, the police received a tip from an informant 
"about a marijuana growing operation." Id. at 380. The informant told the detective 
"that he had seen roughly forty marijuana plants at a house occupied by [the defendants] . 
. . [and he] described some details about the growing operation, including its location in a 
basement crawl space, and the lighting and drying mechanisms employed." Id. The 
detective "prepared an affidavit recounting [the informant's] information and the result of 
the DMV check [on the names provided by the informant], which he then submitted as 
part of his application for a warrant authorizing the search of defendants' home." Id The 
defendants later filed motions to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, 
alleging in part "that the warrant should not have issued without some independent 
corroboration of the information [the informant] provided." Id The Vermont Supreme 
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Court agreed, noting that the detective's "only attempts at corroboration were a drive-by 
of the residence, and a DMV check of the names that [the informant] gave him." Id at 
383. The court explained that "[w]hile the DMV report did corroborate some of the 
peripheral details of [the informant's] story, it did nothing to confirm the allegations of 
criminal conduct. Overall, the affidavit provided little evidence that [the detective] had 
corroborated [the informant's] information about the marijuana growing operation." Id, 
Similarly, in this case, Detective Teerlink failed to corroborate the informant's 
allegations of criminal conduct or any incriminating aspects of the tip. In fact, Detective 
Teerlink only confirmed that the address listed on Mr. Keener's driver's license matched 
the address provided by the informant. This information did not demonstrate that Mr. 
Lambson had "knowledge of concealed criminal activity;" rather, it only helped 
Detective Teerlink "correctly identify the person whom [Mr. Lambson] mean[t] to 
accuse." See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000); see also People v. Scoma, 455 
P.2d 419, 424 (Cal. 1969) ("Of no greater assistance is the fact that [the defendant's] past 
and present addresses were those provided by the informant; again, no inference of 
criminal activity on [the defendant's] part may be drawn."). 
Moreover, Detective Teerlink stated in the affidavit that he believed Mr. 
Lambson's information "to be accurate and reliable because . . . Daniel Lee Keener has 
been arrested for numerous thefts[,] . . . [and] numerous drug charges." See R. 79-81. 
However, Mr. Keener's "criminal record also [did] nothing to establish that he is 
currently dealing in controlled substances" or otherwise engaged in criminal activity. See 
State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Accordingly, Detective 
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Teerlink's assertion that he believed the informant's tip to be accurate and reliable based 
on Mr. Keener's record of past arrests does not bolster his affidavit in support of probable 
cause. Therefore, because Detective Teerlink did not make a significant independent 
corroborative effort and did not confirm any of the informant's allegations of criminal 
activity, the trial court erred in finding the affidavit was sufficient to support a finding of 
probable cause to search Mr. Keener's residence 
B. The Detective's Intentional or Reckless Omission of the Informant's 
Criminal History in the Affidavit Materially Affected the Finding of 
Probable Cause. 
"Just as police officers may not include materially false statements in a warrant 
affidavit, they similarly cannot omit information that 'materially affects the finding of 
probable cause.'" State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, ^ 15, 100 P.3d 1222 (quoting 
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191). An omission is considered material "[i]f an affidavit fails to 
support a finding of probable cause after . . . the omitted information is added." Nielsen, 
727 P.2d at 191. If this is the case, "any evidence obtained under the improperly issued 
warrant must be suppressed." IdL Because the informant in this case had a criminal 
history and was under investigation for attempting to pawn a stolen ring at the time he 
provided the tip to Detective Teerlink, he was not an inherently reliable informant. 
The failure to disclose an informant's criminal history in an affidavit for a search 
warrant has been disapproved of by several state courts. For example, in State v. Bittner, 
832 P.2d 529 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992), the defendants appealed their convictions for drug 
possession, "contending that the trial court erred in admitting evidence obtained during 
the execution of a search warrant." Id. at 530. The affidavit for the warrant at issue 
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stated that a "concerned citizen" had observed a drug transaction in the defendants' 
residence and had later accompanied the detective to this residence, where he "confirmed 
that the vehicle [in the driveway] belonged to [one of the defendants]." Id. Although the 
detective who prepared the affidavit was aware of the informant's identity, the affidavit 
specifically requested "that the identity of the concerned citizen be known only to your 
affiant. . . because the concerned citizen fears swift and sure retribution from the suspect 
parties." Id However, the affidavit failed to reveal that the informant "had a prior 
criminal record of reckless driving and driving while intoxicated, and that he had 
previously contacted the police to discuss his impersonation of a police officer." Id. 
Although the court found that the affidavit on its face lacked sufficient evidence to 
support a finding of probable cause, the court also "note[d] with disapproval the type of 
affidavit produced here. The picture of the informant created by the affidavit for a search 
warrant was not in accord with the true facts . . . [and] it was error not to have included in 
the affidavit that the 'concerned citizen' had previously contacted the sheriffs office 
because he had been investigated for a crime. This type of information could influence a 
magistrate's decision in assessing the reliability of an informant's tip." Id. at 533. See 
also State v. Chenoweth, 158 P.3d 595, 610 (Wash. 2007) (distinguishing Bittner because 
"there [was] no showing that the police affiant knew more about [the informant's] 
criminal involvement than was disclosed during the warrant application. . . . [and] the 
police affiant did not gloss over the informant's identity by characterizing him as a 
'concerned citizen' but disclosed his name and known criminal history"); State v. 
Goldberg, 872 A.2d 378, 382 (Vt. 2005) (holding that the affidavit failed to demonstrate 
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the credibility of the informant and thus did not establish probable cause for a search 
warrant, in part because it "failed to describe [the informant's] criminal history.55); Davis 
v. State, 637 S.E.2d 431, 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that "although it is not clear 
whether the omission was intentional, [the detective] was aware of [the informant's] 
criminal history and such information should have been provided to the magistrate55); 
Brown v. State, 535 S.E.2d 785, 787 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) ("In order to fully apprise the 
magistrate, an officer seeking a warrant should provide the magistrate with any 
information relevant to the informant's reliability, including information about his 
criminal history or any pending criminal charges.55). 
In this case, as in Brttner, "the picture of the informant created by the affidavit for 
a search warrant was not in accord with the true facts.55 See Bittaer, 832 P.2d at 530. 
The affidavit failed to disclose both Mr. Lambson's criminal history and the fact that he 
was under investigation at the time he provided the information to Detective Teerlink. 
Mr. Lambson's criminal history, which a search of court records in Utah appears to 
include a conviction for possessing/consuming/purchasing alcohol by a minor, class B 
misdemeanor, on December 3, 2001; an arrest for aggravated assault on November 11, 
2001, which was dismissed due to the witness not being present; convictions for improper 
usage of lanes, a class C misdemeanor and operating a vehicle without insurance, a class 
B misdemeanor, on January 11, 2005; an arrest for acquiring a controlled substance by 
prescription alteration on May 18, 2005, dismissed without prejudice; and, currently 
pending charges, unrelated to this case, of 5 second degree felony Theft charges, 1 third 
degree felony Theft charge and 3 class A misdemeanor Criminal Mischief charges 
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allegedly occurring on November 6, 2004. R. 63-64. Mr. Lambson's criminal history, 
along with the fact that he was a suspect in the theft of jewelry, showed he was an 
unreliable informant. This constitutes a material omission because these facts, had they 
been included in the affidavit, may have significantly influenced the magistrate's 
assessment of the reliability of Mr. Lambson's allegations and the ultimate finding of 
probable cause. Additionally, the omission of Mr. Lambson's criminal history further 
illustrates the intentional or reckless intent of the detective in trying to mislead the court 
in establishing probable cause because he was aware that a criminal history might have 
some affect on probable cause, as he included Mr. Keener's criminal history in the 
affidavit. 
Therefore, although the affidavit reveals Mr. Lambson's name, it was error to 
misrepresent his identity by characterizing him as a "concerned citizen" and failing to 
reveal his criminal history. See People v. Smith, 553 P.2d 557, 560 (Cal. 1976) (noting 
that "persons criminally involved or disposed are not regarded as 'citizen-informants' 
because they are generally motivated by something other than good citizenship") 
(internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Notably, some state courts have held that the omission of an informant's criminal 
history in an affidavit for a search warrant does not necessarily negate a finding of 
probable cause, provided that the informant's statements are independently corroborated 
by police. See, e.g.. Brown v. State, 535 S.E.2d 785, 787 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) ("If any 
omissions on the part of the officer are offset by independent corroboration of criminal 
activity, then the magistrate may still have sufficient information to find that probable 
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cause exists."); Davis v. State, 637 S.E.2d 431, 437 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (noting that 
because the omission of [the informant's] criminal record was offset by independent 
corroboration of criminal activity, reversal [was]]not required."); cf State v. Goldberg, 
872 A.2d 378, 379 (Vt. 2005) (holding that "the warrant should not have issued based 
solely on an uncorroborated Up from an informant with a significant criminal record" 
(emphasis added)). However, not only did the affidavit in this case omit the informant's 
criminal history, the affidavit also lacked probable cause because the informant was not 
inherently reliable and Detective Teerlink failed to independently corroborate the 
allegations of criminal activity. 
C. Where The Detective's Misstatements And Omissions Were Intentionally 
Or Recklessly False And Material And The Affidavit Otherwise Fails To 
Establish Probable Cause, The Evidence Should Be Suppressed. 
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held 
that a search pursuant to a warrant secured by false statements can violate the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 155-56. In Franks, the Court 
recognized that the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement rests 
on the premise "that there will be a truthful showing" of probable cause. If 
the trial court finds that a false statement in a warrant affidavit was made 
deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth and that the false 
statement materially affected the magistrate's determination of probable 
cause, "the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search 
excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of 
the affidavit. 
State v. Krukowski, 2004 UT 94, f 14, 100 P.3d 1222 (citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). Our supreme court extended this reasoning to situations where "a misstatement 
occurs because information is omitted." Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191; Krukowski, 2004 UT 
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94 at TJ15. When information has been omitted, "the affidavit must be evaluated to 
determine if it will support a finding of probable cause when the omitted information is 
inserted." Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191. "If an affidavit fails to support a finding of probable 
cause after . . . the omitted information is added," then the information that has been 
omitted will be considered to "materially affect[] the finding of probable cause, [and] any 
evidence obtained under the improperly issued warrant must be suppressed." Id. 
As argued above, the affidavit submitted by Detective Teerlink in this case failed 
to support a finding of probable cause. See supra Points A & B. Detective Teerlink's 
intentional or reckless reference to Mr. Lambson as a "concerned citizen" rather than a 
criminal informant, along with the omitted information regarding Mr. Lambson's 
criminal history and failure to corroborate the details of the allegations of criminal 
activity, materially affected the finding of probable cause. Once the omitted information 
regarding Mr. Lambson's status is corrected to reflect that he offered information about 
Mr. Keener only after he was picked up and held for questioning by police officers for 
trying to pawn a stolen ring, along with his criminal history, then his hearsay statements 
used in the affidavit become inherently less reliable. See McArthur, 2000 UT App 23 at 
[^31 (noting that an "informant who gains information through criminal activity . . .is 
lower on the reliability scale than a citizen informant"(quotations and citation omitted)); 
Spillers, 847 N.E.2d at 956 (noting that unlike those cases where "an informant, after 
arrest or confrontation by police, admit[s to] committing criminal offense under 
circumstances in which the crimes otherwise would likely have gone undetected" the 
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informant in Spillers did not make statements against his penal interest where he "was 
caught 'red-handed' with drugs in his possession before naming his purported supplier"). 
Because Mr. Lambson's hearsay statements alone were unreliable to support a 
finding of probable cause, it was necessary for the statements to be independently 
corroborated. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332 at 1J15; Frazier, 423 F.3d at 532 ("[I]n the 
absence of any indicia of the informants' reliability, courts insist that the affidavit contain 
substantial independent police corroboration."). However, the detectives failed to 
corroborate the allegations of criminal conduct or any incriminating aspects of the tip. 
The affidavit states that the detective "considered] the information received from the 
concerned citizen to be accurate and reliable because" Mr. Lambson provided his name, 
date of birth and criminal history and was informed that he would be charged with 
interfering in an investigation. R. 80. Instead of relating any independent corroboration 
of the hearsay statements, the affidavit states that Mr. Lambson was shown the list of 
stolen jewelry taken during the vehicle burglary and he "identified a yellow and white 
gold diamond ring and a Blue turquoise stretch bracelet as items he saw in Daniel V. 
Keener [Appellant's father] bag of jewelry at the listed residence." R. 80. After listing 
the criminal history of Mr. Keener's father, the affidavit simply states that the detective 
has confirmed that the address listed on Mr. Keener's drivers license matches the address 
provided by Mr. Lambson and states that Mr. Keener "has been arrested for numerous" 
charges. R. 80. 
The detective's intentional or reckless omission of Mr. Lambson's correct status as 
a criminal informant materially affected the finding of probable cause by making the 
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hearsay statement appear independently reliable without the need for any corroboration. 
Once the misstatement is corrected to reflect that Mr. Lambson's informant status is 
unreliable, necessitating significant independent corroboration which the detectives failed 
to do, then the Fourth Amendment requires that the evidence be suppressed. 
POINT II. EVEN IF PROBABLE CAUSE DID EXIST, UTAH'S 
CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THE EVIDENCE BE SUPPRESSED 
WHERE MISSTATEMENTS AND OMISSIONS HAVE BEEN 
INTENTIONALLY OR RECKLESSLY MADE TO THE COURT TO 
SECURE A SEARCH WARRANT. 
When interpreting the Utah Constitution, this Court has "cited with favor the 
traditional methods of constitutional analysis." State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, *[  37, 
162 P.3d 1106. These traditional methods "'look primarily to the language of the 
constitution itself but may also look to 'historical and textual evidence, sister state law, 
and policy arguments in the form of economic and sociological materials to assist us in 
arriving at a proper interpretation of the provision in question."5 State v. Gardner, 947 
P.2d 630, 633 (Utah 1997) (quoting Soc'y of Separationists v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 
921 n.6 (Utah 1993)); Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 at |^37 (citation omitted). This traditional 
state constitutional analysis demonstrates that article 1, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution provides Utah citizens with a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth 
Amendment. 
First, although article 1, section 14 contains the identical language of the Fourth 
Amendment, the Utah Supreme Court has "held on more than one occasion that article 1, 
section 14 provides a greater expectation of privacy than the Fourth Amendment as 
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court." State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, If 12, 
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996 P.2d 546; see also Brigham City v. Stuart. 126 S.Ct. 1943, 1950 (2006) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (recognizing that "the Utah Constitution provides greater protection to the 
privacy of the home than does the Fourth Amendment"). In fact, the court specifically 
noted in State v. Watts that giving "the Utah Constitution a somewhat different 
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating this state's citizens 
from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the 
federal courts." 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah 1988); see also DeBoov, 2000 UT 32 at <f 
12 (noting that the Utah Supreme Court "will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a 
different construction where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this 
state's citizens."); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 417-18, 420 (Utah 1991) 
(suppressing evidence under article I, section 14 of Utah Constitution due to greater 
privacy expectation in bank in tax records than under Fourth Amendment); State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469-71 (Utah 1990) (construing article I, section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution to afford greater privacy interests than the Fourth Amendment). 
Additionally, the unique history of the early settlers of Utah explains the greater 
protection afforded Utah citizens by article 1, section 14 because the drafters of the Utah 
Constitution were "acutely concerned with providing protection and remedies against 
unlawful searches and seizures." Kenneth R. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and 
Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14, 17 J. Contemp. 
L. 267, 279 (1991). The Mormon pioneers in Utah suffered severe persecution due to 
their religious beliefs and their practice of polygamy in particular, which the federal 
government made several attempts to eradicate. See Edwin Brown Firmage & Richard 
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Collin Mangrum, Zion in the Courts 161 (1988). As a result, in an effort "to enforce the 
anti-polygamy acts of Congress, the Fourth Amendment rights of Mormon pioneers 
against unreasonable searches and seizures were continuously violated." Id at 226-27. 
Specifically, United States Marshals searching for violators of the anti-polygamy laws 
"saw little need" to comply with search warrant requirements and began employing spies, 
spotters, and informants in an effort to discover polygamists. Kenneth R. Wallentine, 
Heeding the Call: Search and Sezure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article 
I, Section 14, 17 J. Contemp. L. 267, 278 (1991). Consequently, as the Utah Supreme 
Court noted in DeBooy, 2000 UT 32 at ^ 26, Utah's "early settlers were themselves no 
strangers to the abuses of [the warrant requirement]. Underlying the abuse of the [] 
warrant was the perversion of the prosecutorial function from investigating known crimes 
to investigating individuals for the purpose of finding criminal behavior." Id. at [^26. 
Therefore, the historical circumstances surrounding the creation of the Utah Constitution 
indicate that the reason for the drafters' decision to include article 1, section 14 was to 
provide Utahns with additional protection, ensuring that the Fourth Amendment search 
and seizure abuses of the past never repeated themselves. 
Finally, Utah is not alone in assuring its citizens a greater expectation of privacy. 
Many other state courts have interpreted the search and seizure provisions of their own 
constitutions to provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. 
Neal, 164 P.3d 57, 62 (N.M. 2007) (noting that the search and seizure provision of the 
New Mexico constitution "has been construed to provide broader protections than the 
Fourth Amendment"); State v. Mariano, 160 P.3d 1258, 1268 (Haw.Ct. App. 2007) 
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(recognizing that Hawai'i courts are "free to give broader privacy protection than that 
given by the federal constitution^] and 'have often extended the protections of the 
Hawai'i Constitution beyond those of the United States Constitution^] particularly in the 
search-and-seizure context.") (internal citations omitted); Brumfield v. State, 155 P.3d 
826? 833 (Okla. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that Oklahoma courts are "free to interpret [the] 
state constitution, with its own protection against 'unreasonable searches or seizures,' 
more broadly than the United States Supreme Court interprets the federal constitution."); 
State v. Malkuch, 154 P.3d 558, 560 (Mont. 2007) (noting that "[t]he Montana 
Constitution provides a greater right of privacy than the United States Constitution, and 
therefore 'provides broader protection than the Fourth Amendment in cases involving 
searches of private property.'") (internal citation omitted); State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 
1201, 1237 (Wash. 2006) (noting that the inquiry as to whether a search has occurred "is 
broader under the state constitution than under the Fourth Amendment"); People v. 
Rossman, 140 P.3d 172, 176 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations omitted) 
("Although the Colorado and United States Constitutions are generally co-extensive 
insofar as they address warrantless searches and seizures, . . . [the search and seizure 
provision] of the Colorado Constitution affords broader protections than the Fourth 
Amendment."). 
In sum, Utah case law, historical circumstances, and the number of other state 
courts that interpret their own constitutions more broadly than the Fourth Amendment all 
demonstrate that the Utah Constitution provides Utah citizens with greater protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Therefore, this Court should evaluate the 
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sufficiency of the affidavit under the Utah Constitution so that it can "fulfill its 
'responsibility as guardians of the individual liberty of [Utah] citizens.'5' Brigham City, 
126 S.Ct. at 1950 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting the Utah Supreme Court's opinion in 
Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT 13, If 14, 122 P.3d 506). To this end, under Utah's 
Constitution, a search warrant that has been secured by a law enforcement officer making 
intentionally or reckless misstatements or omissions in their sworn affidavit must be 
invalidated regardless of the presence of probable cause. 
In Nielsen, the defendant argued that the search warrant used to search his 
residence was invalid under the fourth amendment because the officer made intentional 
misstatements in the affidavit. 727 P.2d at 189. In his affidavit, the detective stated that 
he had been told by a confidential informant "that an individual living at Nielsen's 
address and driving a car with a personalized license plate reading 'Skydive' possessed 
one-half pound of cocaine valued at approximately $16,000." Id. at 190. In addition, the 
detective stated that he had corroborated the informant's statements and considered them 
reliable "because the informant's previous tips had led to the arrests of three individuals 
on drug-related charges. Id. Based on the detective's affidavit, a search warrant for 
narcotics was issued for Nielsen's residence. Id. At Nielsen's preliminary hearing, the 
detective reiterated the statements made in his affidavit concerning the circumstances 
establishing probable cause. Id. 
The prosecution later revealed that the detective had made false statements in his 
affidavit. Id. Specifically, the detective "did not know the informant, had never had any 
personal contact with him, and had no personal knowledge of any facts relevant to the 
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informant's credibility." Id. On appeal, Nielsen argued that the evidence should be 
suppressed because the affidavit containing false statements rendered the search warrant 
invalid. Id. The state argued that the detective's "false statements were not made 
intentionally, knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, but were merely 
inadvertent technical errors . . . ." Id. at 191. In rejecting the state's argument and 
concluding that the detective's statements were made "knowingly false" the court stated 
A law enforcement officer must be aware not only of the need for accuracy 
in the information provided to a magistrate in support of an application for 
a search warrant, but also of the importance of absolute truthfulness in any 
statement made under oath. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In upholding a search warrant under the fourth amendment, the court noted that 
"[d]eterrence of police misconduct is not to be a factor in the decision to suppress [under 
the Fourth Amendment] unless the misconduct materially affects the finding of probable 
cause." Neilsen, 727 P.2d at 191. However, the court warned "that the federal law as it 
has developed since Franks v. Delaware is not entirely adequate." Id. at 192. The issue of 
whether "an immaterial, intentional misstatement in an affidavit supporting a warrant 
requires suppression of the evidence as a matter of Utah law" has not been decided. Id, at 
193. Although the court upheld the warrant under federal law, it cautioned that 
"[ujpholding of the warrant under federal law should not be read as an endorsement of 
[the detective's] conduct or as a determination of how the issue might be resolved under 
the Utah Constitution." Id. at 192-93. The court left open the question of "what the 
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appropriate remedy might be if Nielsen had argued that the officer's action violated his 
rights under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution." Id 
Recently, the supreme court has reiterated "that Utah's search and seizure 
provisions (which are identical to those in the federal constitution) provide 'a greater 
expectation of privacy than the fourth amendment as interpreted by the United States 
Supreme Court.'" Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49 at l|f34 (citation omitted). The court has held 
that "the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police 
violations of article I, section 14" of the Utah Constitution. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 
460, 472 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion). The court has determined that Utah's 
exclusionary rule should be extended in circumstances where "exclusion is necessary to 
deter future unconstitutional searches." Sims v. Collection Division of the Utah State 
Tax Commission, 841 P.2d 6, 13 (Utah 1992) (extending Utah's exclusionary rule to 
proceedings under the Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act); see also 19 A.L.R. 5th 470 (listing 
states that have recognized the existence of an exclusionary rule derived from their state 
constitution search and seizure provision). The purpose of Utah's exclusionary rule is not 
merely designed to deter police misconduct but exists to vindicate personal privacy rights 
and exclude evidence unlawfully obtained. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472. 
Given the historical circumstances surrounding the inclusion of article I, section 
14 to provide Utahns with additional protection, and ensuring that the fourth amendment 
search and seizure abuses of the past never repeated themselves, it follows that 
intentional or reckless misstatements or omissions made by a detective misleading a court 
about the reliability of the information contained in affidavit in order to secure a search 
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warrant is the type of police misconduct and violation of personal privacy rights that was 
meant to fall within the protecting perimeters of the this clause. Otherwise, these 
constitutional safeguards would quickly lose their prophylactic value. As the supreme 
court has recognized, 
There is no stronger argument for developing adequate remedies for 
violations of the state and federal constitutional prohibitions on 
unreasonable searches and seizures than the example of a police officer 
deliberately lying under oath in order to obtain a search warrant. To allow 
a police officer to obtain a warrant utilizing false information tends to 
undermine respect for the legal system and to make the public cynical about 
the honesty and professionalism of those entrusted with law enforcement." 
Neiisen, 727 P.2d at 192-93. 
In this case, Detective Teerlink acknowledged that he was aware that courts 
accord informants classified as "concerned citizens" more reliability than they do those 
classified as criminal informants. R. 221:26-27. In fact, he testified that he felt it 
necessary to used Mr. Lambson's name in the affidavit because "without his name in the 
search warrant,... I didn't feel like we had enough probable cause." R. 221:25. 
Although Detective Teerlink claimed he did not represent Mr. Lambson as a "concerned 
citizen" or omit his criminal history in an effort to "bolster" his credibility, his testimony 
acknowledges that he knew that incorrectly labeling Mr. Lambson as a "concerned 
citizen" would have that effect. Additionally, Detective Teerlink knew that Mr. Lambson 
had been detained after being caught trying to pawn a stolen ring and was facing possible 
felony charges in connection with that offense when he gave the information, and also, 
that Mr. Lambson had a criminal history. This testimony and the substance of the 
affidavit therefore demonstrate that Detective Teerlink acted at least recklessly in 
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labeling Mr. Lambson as a "concerned citizen" rather than including accurate and correct 
information about Mr. Lambson's status. 
The "[inadequate protection]" of the federal law for Utah's citizens from this 
type of police misconduct and violation of their personal privacy rights necessitates the 
broader protections from Utah's search and seizure clause. 
The historical circumstances surrounding the creation of Utah's constitution 
demonstrates that it is these very sorts of violations that the state's exclusionary rule was 
meant to protect against. Therefore, where a detective intentionally or recklessly 
provides misinformation or omits information to secure a search warrant, whether 
material or immaterial to showing probable cause, that evidence must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant, Mr. Keener, respectfully requests this Court to reverse the trial 
court's denial of his motion to suppress, and reverse his conviction. 
SUBMITTED this ^j^day of November, 2007. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
ANDREA J. GARLAND 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
vs . 
DANIEL LEE KEENER, 
Defendant. 
Case No: 051909085 FS 
Judge: JUDITH S ATHERTON 
Date: May 4, 2 007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: sunshinb 
Prosecutor: STOTT, ROBERT L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): GARLAND, ANDREA J 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: July 3, 1973 
Video 
Tape Count: 10:39:54 
CHARGES 
1. POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/12/2007 Guilty 
2. ENDANGERMENT OF CHILD OR ELDER ADULT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/12/2007 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSS W/ INTENT TO DIST 
C/SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ENDANGERMENT OF CHILD OR 
ELDER ADULT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Page 1 i/O 
Case No: 051909085 
Date: May 04, 2007 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
to run consecutive 
Credit is granted for time served. 
Credit is granted for 2 day(s) previously served. 
Attorney Fees Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LEGAL DEFENDERS 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Participate in and complete any educational; and/or vocational 
training as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Violate no laws. 
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or 
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Perform community service hours. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
distributed illegally. 
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages. 
Comply with A/D clauses per AP&P. Defendant is to maintain full 
time employment. Defendant is to perform 100 hours of community 
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Date: May 04, 2007 
service in lieu of fine. 
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U. S. Constitution Amendment IV 
Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution Article I, Section 14 
Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
STATE OF UTAH) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That your affiant has reason to believe that on the premises known as 849 North Sir Phillip 
Drive, further described as a single family residence constructed of brown brick, tan siding and 
brown trim. The residence is the seventh structure south of 900 North. The residence is located 
on the west side of Sir Phillip Drive and faces to the east. The front door is green in color with a 
black metal screen door. The numbers 849 are clearly printed on the left side of the front door 
and are brown in color. And all rooms, attics, basements, and other parts therein and the 
surrounding grounds and any garages, storage rooms, and outbuildings of any kind located upon 
the curtilage of the residence. 
In the City of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, There is now certain property or evidence described 
as: 
Jewelry, farther described as a "pave" diamond ring designed with yellow and white gold. The 
ring also has a large number of small diamonds. It is described by the owner as a custom "one of 
a kind" ring, (see attached list of jewelry and drawing). 
Jewelry, further described as a blue turquoise stretch bracelet (see attached list of jewelry) 
Jewelry, further described as miscellaneous jewelry stolen in a vehicle burglary at 145 West 
Pierpont Avenue on 11/5/2005. (see attached list of jewelry) 
Marijuana, farther described as a green leafy substance; material related to the possession or 
distribution of marijuana including bags, scales, measuring devices; and drug paraphernalia 
described as rolling papers or pipes used for smoking marijuana. 
Articles of personal property tending to establish and document sales of stolen jewelry and a 
controlled substance including U.S. currency, buyer and seller lists, and other documentation of 
sales of stolen jewelry and controlled substances; articles tending to establish the identity of 
persons in control of the premises sought to be searched including rent receipts, utility receipts, 
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and addressed envelopes, and any other fruits or instrumentality's of the crimes of possession or 
distribution of stolen jewelry and controlled substances. 
And that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has 
been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it 
as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes 
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
Your affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crimes of 
Possession of Stolen Property, Possession and or Distribution of a Controlled Substance. 
THE FACTS TO ESTABLISH THE GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH 
WARRANT ARE: 
Your affiant is a Salt Lake City Police Officer and has been a police officer for over 5 years. 
Your affiant is currently assigned to the Salt Lake City Police Department's Narcotic Unit and 
investigates narcotic related offenses. Your affiant has had training in narcotics identification and 
in the investigation of narcotic related offenses through the Utah Police Academy and the 
California Narcotics Association. Your affiant's specialized training includes the DEA 
Clandestine Laboratory Course. Your affiant has worked street level drug interdiction as an 
arresting officer and as an undercover police officer. Your affiant has seen several different types 
of narcotics during these operations. Your affiant has been involved with over 400 drug related 
cases, many of which were felonies. 
Within the last 6 hours your affiant has received information from a concerned citizen named 
Gary Lambson. Mr. Lambson stated that there is stolen jewelry at the address of 849 North Sir 
Phillip Drive. He also stated that the individuals who reside or otherwise occupy 849 North Sir 
Phillip Drive are engaging in an ongoing narcotics distribution operation. 
On 12/6/05 Mr. Lambson met with Daniel V. Keener for the purpose of buying jewelry. Daniel 
V. Keener traveled with Mr. Lambson to 849 North Sir Phillip Drive. Mr. Lambson was told 
that this was Daniel V. Keener's son's residence. The son is named Daniel Lee Keener. Inside 
the residence Daniel V. Keener retrieved a bag of jewelry. Mr. Lambson said the bag contained 
rings, necklaces, watches and bracelets. Mr. Lambson purchased a ring for $50 from Daniel V. 
Keener. Mr. Lambson said Daniel V. Keener put some of the jewelry in his pocket and left most A^ 
of the jewelry in the bag at the listed residence. A j ^ \ M ^ 
While in the residence of 849 North Sir Phillip Drive, Mr. Lambson observed the following 
items on a table in a back room; two large bags of marijuana and a triple beam scale. He said 
one of the bags contains chronic marijuana. Chronic is high quality marijuana. The other bag 
contains lower grade marijuana. Mr. Lambson said that Daniel Lee Keener is selling the 
marijuana out of the listed residence. 
On 12/8/05 Mr. Lambson took the ring he purchased to Mike's Custom Jewelry and Repair at 
254 East 6400 South for the purpose of selling it. The clerk at Mike's Jewelry recognized the 
ring as the one that belongs to another employee of Mike's Jewelry named Julie Baker. Mrs. 
Baker identified the ring to be a custom made ring that was stolen out of her vehicle along with 
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other jewelry on 11/5/05 at 145 West Pierpont Avenue (Salt Lake City case number 05-193011). 
The police responded to Mike's Jewelry and questioned Mr. Lambson. 
Your affiant showed Mr. Lambson the list of Jewelry stolen during the previously mentioned 
vehicle burglary. Mr. Lambson identified a yellow and wrhite gold diamond ring and a Blue 
turquoise stretch bracelet as items he saw in Daniel V Keener bag of jewelry at the listed 
residence. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the concerned citizen to be accurate and 
reliable because: 
The concerned citizen, Gary Lambson, has provided your affiant with his name, date of birth and 
criminal history. Your affiant informed Mr. Lambson that if he gave your affiant any false 
information he would be charged with interfering with an investigation. 
Your affiant has checked police and state records and found that Daniel V Keener has been 
arrested numerous times for Possession of a Controlled Substance, the most recent arrest was on 
5/5/2002. He was also arrested for Carrying a Loaded Fire Arm in a Vehicle on 6/30/89. Your 
affiant has also found that Daniel Lee Keener5s drivers license shows the address of 849 North 
Sir Phillip Drive. Daniel Lee Keener has been arrested for numerous thefts including an 
Aggravated Burglary on 02/26/2000, numerous drug charges (the most recent on 05/12/05) and 
Strong Arm Robbery on 10/05/91. 
Your affiant desires to enter 849 North Sir Phillip Drive and search for stolen jewelry, marijuana, 
marijuana paraphernalia and other items related to the distribution of marijuana. The 
paraphernalia includes such items as pipes, bongs or tubes used to inhale or smoke marijuana. 
Other related items include packaging material used to package marijuana and scales used to 
weigh quantities. Your affiant knows from training and experience that these items are almost 
always found on the premises where search warrants for controlled substances have been 
executed. 
Your affiant desires to search for records of stolen jewelry and marijuana sales, both written and 
electronic, residency papers and U.S. currency. Your affiant knows from past experiences with 
narcotic investigations that persons sometimes record their sales to show dates, amounts 
purchased and drug indebtedness. Your affiant knows from training and experience that stolen 
jewelry and marijuana is sold for U.S. currency. The concerned citizen purchased the stolen ring 
with U.S. currency. 
This application for search warrant has been reviewed and approved for presentation to the court 
by Deputy District Attorney 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a search warrant be issued for the seizure of said items 
any time day or night because there is reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior 
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good reasons to wit: 
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PAGE - 4 -
Your affiant knows from training and experience that persons who sell stolen property or 
narcotic distribution operation do not keep regular business hours and commonly sell at night. 
Daniel V Keener sold the concerned citizen the stolen ring at night. 
The residence your affiant desires to search is located in a residential community. Your affiant 
feels that it would be safer for children who may live in the area as well as the other residents of 
the neighborhood if the warrant were to be served in the evening hours, during a time when the 
pedestrian traffic around the neighborhood is less. 
It is further requested that the officer executing the requested search warrant not be required to 
give notice of the officer's authority or purpose because: 
Physical harm may result to any person if notice was given, and/or the property sought may 
quickly be destroyed, disposed of, or secreted. 
This danger is believed to exist because: 
Daniel V Keener has been arrested for carrying a loaded firearm in a Vehicle. Daniel Lee 
Keener has been arrested for Aggravated Burglary and Strong Arm Robbery. Your affiant feels 
it would be safer for officers serving the warrant and persons inside the residence if police 
officers were not required to give notice before entering the residence. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this ^ day of 
l)f<o - __2005. 
v—-Judge of the Third 
i district Court 
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In the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DANIEL L. KEENER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION RE 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS SEARCH 
WARRANT 
Case No. 051909085 
Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
The defendant, Daniel Lee Keener, has filed a motion to suppress "evidence seized pursuant 
to the execution of a search warrant." Motion to Suppress Search Warrant and Memorandum in 
Support Thereof "(the "Motion"), p. 1. Keener claims that the warrant is infirm because the Affidavit 
for Search Warrant did not disclose that the source of much of the information set forth therein was 
an individual detained by the police in connection with a "stolen ring," and not a "concerned 
citizen," as the affidavit states.1 For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the Motion.2 
BACKGROUND 
Detectives Michael Hardin and Doug Teerlink are veteran police officers with the Salt Lake 
City Police Department, hi December 2005, Hardin was investigating a reported vehicle burglary, 
and Teerlink was investigating a potential marijuana distributor. 
On December 9, 2005, in connection with their investigations, Detectives Hardin and 
Teerlink simultaneously approached Third District Court Judge Judith Atherton and asked that she 
issue two search warrants. One of the warrants was for 1381 South Emery Street and the person of 
Daniel Vera Keener. The other warrant was for 849 North Sir Phillip Drive, the residence of Daniel 
Vern Keener's son, the defendant. Hardin swore to the affidavit for the Emery Street warrant, and 
Teerlink swore to the affidavit for the Sir Phillip Drive warrant. 
The principal source of information for both affidavits is an individual named Gary Lambson. 
Both affidavits describe Lambson as a "concerned citizen"; however, the affidavit sworn to by 
*For the "concerned citizen" reference, see the Affidavit for Search Warrant of Detective Doug 
Teerlink ("Teerlink Affidavit"). For the "stolen ring" reference, see the Affidavit for Search Warrant of 
Detective Michael Hardin ("Hardin Affidavit"). Both affidavits are attached to the Motion. 
2The Motion came on for hearing on October 11, 2006. Jacey Skinner represented the State; 
Andrea Garland represented Keener, who was also present. 
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Detective Hardin also notes that Murray Police had detained Lambson "concerning a stolen ring." 
Hardin Affidavit, p. 2. 
Lambson told Detective Hardin that he had "purchased the ring from" Daniel Vern Keener. 
Id. More specifically, Lambson told Hardin that on December 6, 2005, he "met with Daniel Vern 
Keener for the purpose of buying jewelry." Id. To this end, Lambson traveled with Daniel Vern 
Keener "to 849 North Sir Phillip Drive," Daniel Lee Keener's residence. Id. Once "[i]nside the [Sir 
Phillip Drive] residence," Daniel Vern Keener "retrieved a bag of jewelry" that "contained rings, 
necklaces, watches, and bracelets." Id. Lambson purchased the ring "for $50." Id. Lambson also 
told Hardin that Daniel Vern Keener "left most of the jewelry in the bag at" the Sir Phillip Drive 
address. Id. 
On December 8, 2005, Lambson attempted to sell the ring at Mike's Custom Jewelry and 
Repair. The clerk recognized the ring as one that belonged to "another employee of Mike's Jewelry 
named Julie Baker." Id. "Baker identified the ring to be a custom made ring that was stolen out of 
her vehicle along with other jewelry" on November 5, 2005, "at 145 West Pierpont Avenue (Salt 
Lake City case number 05-193011)." Id. 
Detective Hardin then showed Lambson a "list of the jewelry [reported] stolen" from 
Baker's vehicle. Id. (A copy of the list is attached to the detective's affidavit.) Lambson identified 
two pieces as items he saw in the "bag of jewelry at the residence located" on North Sir Phillip 
Drive-"a yellow and white gold diamond ring and a Blue [sic] turquoise stretch bracelet." Id. 
Lambson also told the detectives that "[wjhile in the residence of 849 North Sir Phillip 
Drive," he saw "two large bags of marijuana and a triple beam scale" sitting "on a table in a back 
room." Teerlink Affidavit, p. 2. According to Lambson, "one of the bags contained] chronic 
marijuana." Id. ("Chronic is a high quality marijuana." Id.) 
The detectives considered the information provided by Lambson "to be accurate and 
reliable." Id., p. 3. For reasons, the detectives noted, among others, thafLambson provided them 
with his "name, date of birth and criminal history" and that they placed him on notice that they 
would charge him with criminal conduct if any of the information he gave them turned out to be 
false. Id. 
ANALYSIS 
Keener contends that the execution of the search warrant on his residence violated Article 
I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The Court first examines Keener's contention under the Utah constitution. See State V. Holm, 2006 
UT 31, P 33,137 P.3d 726 ("Because this court has endorsed the primacy approach to constitutional 
challenges, whereby we first attempt to resolve the constitutional challenges by appealing to our 
state constitution before turning to the federal constitution. . . ."); see also Sinead McLoughlin, 
High Court Study; Choosing a "Primacy" Approach: Chief Justice Christine M. Durham 
2 
Advocating States Rights in Our Federalist System, 65 ALB. L. REV. 1161 (2002). Because the 
state constitutional analysis is dispositive, the Court does not address Keener's federal challenge.3 
The primary question the Motion presents is whether an "intentional misstatement in an 
affidavit supporting a warrant," whether the misstatement be material or immaterial, "requires 
suppression of the evidence" under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution. State v. Nielsen, 
727 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah 1986). Because the Court finds no misstatement, the question remains 
open. 
Had Detective Teerlink's affidavit stood alone, his characterization of Lambson as a 
"concerned citizen" would be troubling to the court. But it did not stand alone; rather, it was 
submitted alongside Detective Hardin's affidavit, which pointed out that Lambson had been 
"detained by Murray Police" regarding "a stolen ring." Hardin Affidavit, p. 2. That reference in 
Detective Hardin's affidavit, combined with Detective Teerlink's knowledge that Judge Atherton 
would be reviewing both his and Detective Hardin's affidavits together, dispelled any potential false 
impression. It is as if the detectives defined "concerned citizen" to mean Gary Lambson, a person 
of interest detained by the authorities.4 
The secondary question is whether, assuming the accuracy of the "concerned citizen " 
reference, the Teerlink Affidavit provided Judge Atherton with probable cause to issue the search 
warrant for the Sir Phillip Drive residence. "Where a search warrant supported by an affidavit is 
challenged as having been issued without an adequate showing of probable cause,... [the court's] 
review focuses on the magistrate's probable cause determination." State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, 
P 14, 48 P.3d 872 (citations omitted). "In reviewing the magistrate's decision, . . . [the court] 
assess[es] whether the magistrate had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause 
existed." Id. (internal quotations omitted). Further, the court affords "the magistrate's decision 
great deference and considers] the affidavit relied upon by the magistrate in its entirety and in a 
common sense fashion." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
Having reviewed Teerlink's Affidavit in its entirety, the court concludes that Judge 
Atherton "had a substantial basis for determining that probable cause existed and that evidence of 
illegal conduct would be found at the" Sir Phillip Drive location. Id., P 16. The Teerlink Affidavit 
contained a detailed account of a transaction at the Sir Phillip Drive residence involving the 
purchase of reportedly stolen merchandise. It also contained an account of the existence of 
3The parties agree that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah constitution does not provide less 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. Therefore, a finding that the Sir Phillip Drive warrant was constitutionally permissible 
under a state constitutional analysis necessarily means that it was permissible under a federal 
constitutional analysis too. 
4The State suggests that it was more accurate for the detectives to refer to Lambson as a 
"concerned citizen" than an "informant" as the detectives promised Lambson nothing in exchange for the 
infonnation. 
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marijuana that was specific as to quantity, type, and location. This particularized information, 
combined with the fact that the detectives knew Lambson's identity and disclosed it, that Lambson 
obtained his information first-hand, and that he was willing to stand behind the information despite 
being threatened with prosecution if it turned out to be false provides the requisite substantial basis. 
See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640, 644 (Utah App. 1993) (probable cause found where "no 
indication in the facts that the [confidential] informant received anything from the police in 
exchange for the information" and where the information was "based on personal observation" and 
"substantiated."). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the Motion.5 The matter is referred back to 
Judge Atherton for any further proceedings. 
h 
DATED this _g_ day of November, 2006. 
BY THE COURT 
5The court is of the opinion that additional oral argument would not be helpful; therefore, it is 
striking the hearing in this matter currently set for November 17, 2006. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
STATE OF UTAH) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake) 
The undersigned affiant-being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
that on the premises known as 1381 South Emery Street, a single family dwellmg, located on the 
east side of Emery and faces to the west. It is the third structure south of Utahna and is brown 
brick, with white shutters. The front door is brown with a white screen door. The numbers 
613 81' are black and painted on the front stairs; to include all rooms, attics, basements, and other 
parts therein and the surrounding grounds and any garages, storage rooms, and outbuildings of 
any kind located upon the curtilage of the property. 
And on the person known as Daniel Vern Keener a white male adult D.O.B. 05-19-1954, 
approximately 5'10" and 190 pounds with grey hair; 
In the City of Salt Lake City, State of Utah, there is now certain property or evidence described 
as: 
An Anne Klein wrist watch described as a silver colored watch with a black face, with the name 
of'Anne Klein' printed on the face, 
And that said property or evidence was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or has 
been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or is being possessed with the purpose to use it 
as a means of committing or concealing a public offense and consists of an item or constitutes 
evidence of illegal conduct possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
Your affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crimes of 
Burglary and Possession of Stolen Property. 
THE FACTS TO ESTABLISH THE GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH 
WARRANT ARE: 
Your affiant is a Salt Lake City Police Officer and has been a police officer for over 9 years. 
Your affiant is currently assigned to the Salt Lake City Police Department's Burglary Unit and 
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investigates burglary and theft related offenses. Your affiant has had training which includes the 
Utah police Academy, and other POST certified investigative training, which included training 
concerning property crimes. 
Your affiant was contacted by Murray City Detectives concerning a person detained JFoj 
possession of a ring which was taken during a vehicle burglary in Salt Lake City on November 6, 
2005. At the time of this burglary a large amount of jewelry was taken including a Anne Klein 
watch, a Pave diamond ring, a Tiffany necklace with 'Tiffany' inscribed on the necklace and 
matching bracelet, a Omega yellow gold necklace, a diamond yellow gold tennis bracelet, a 
diamond cross necklace in white gold, turquoise necklace blue with small brown beads, red and 
silver earrings, an antique white gold ring with a pink sapphire stone, a silver and pink ring with 
cubic zirconias, a blue and silver ring with cubic zirconias, and yellow gold diamond stud 
earrings. 
Other property taken in the burglary include the victims clothing, Ipod mp3 player, Louis 
Vuitton bags, 'Mac' makeup, Louis Vuitton sunglasses, among other items on attached list. 
Within the last 6 hours your affiant interviewed Gary Lambson, who was detained by Murray 
Police, concerning a stolen ring. Mr. Lambson stated that he purchased the ring from the suspect -
Daniel V Keener who lives at 1381 South Emery Street. 
On 12/6/05 Mr. Lambson met with Daniel V Keener for the purpose of buying jewelry. Daniel 
V Keener traveled with Mr. Lambson to 849 North Sir Phillip Drive. Mr. Lambson was told that 
this was Daniel V Keener's son's residence. The son is named Daniel Lee Keener. Inside the 
residence Daniel V Keener retrieved a bag of jewelry. Mr. Lambson said the bag contained 
rings, necklaces, watches and bracelets. Mr. Lambson purchased a ring for $50 from Daniel V 
Keener. 
Mr. Lambson said that Daniel V Keener put some of the jewelry to include the listed Anne Klein 
wrist watch in his pocket and left most of the jewelry hi the bag at the listed residence. Daniel V. 
Keener then traveled back to his residence at 1381 South Emery St 
On 12/8/05 Mr. Lambson took the ring to Mike's Custom Jewelry and Repair at 254 East 6400 
South for the purpose of selling it. The clerk at Mike's Jewelry recognized the ring as the one 
that belongs to another employee of Mike's Jewelry named Julie Baker. Mrs. Baker identified 
the ring to be a custom made ring that was stolen out of her vehicle along with other jewelry on 
11/5/05 at 145 West Pierpont Avenue (Salt Lake City case number 05-193011). Murray police 
Officer Stallings responded to Mike's Jewelry and questioned Mr. Lambson. Officer Stallings 
contacted your affiant who responded to The Murray Police station and interviewed Mr. 
Lambson and obtained the above information. 
Your affiant showed Mr. Lambson the list of Jewelry stolen during the previously mentioned 
vehicle burglary. Mr. Lambson identified a yellow and white gold diamond ring and a Blue 
turquoise stretch bracelet as items he saw in Daniel V Keener bag of jewelry at the residence 
located on 849 North Sir Phillip Dr. residence. 
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Your affiant considers the information received from the concerned citizen to be accurate and 
reliable because: 
The concerned citizen, Gary Lambson, has provided your affiant with his name, date of birth and 
criminal history. Gary Lambson has provided your affiant information against his best interest. 
Your affiant has independently verified the information that Mr. Lambson has provided and 
found it to be true to the best of your affiants knowledge. Your affiant informed Mr. Lambson 
that if he gave your affiant any false information he would be charged with interfering with an 
investigation. 
MrHLambson also stated that within the last 36 hours, he was in the residence at 1381 South 
Emery Street While in the residence he observed several packages of methamphetamine and 
knows the persons who live at or otherwise occupy the listed residence to be using 
methamphetamine. Mr. Lambson also stated that within the last 48 hours he overheard Daniel V 
Keener stating that he had a shotgun. 
Your affiant knows from training and experience that persons who use methamphetamine often 
exhibit unpredictable, paranoid and potentially violent behavior while under the influence of the 
stimulant. 
Your affiant verified Mr. Lambsons information by checking police and state records and found 
that J)am'el V TCeener has been arrested numerous times for Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, the most recent arrest was on 5/5/2002. He was also arrested for Carrying a Loaded 
Firearm in a Vehicle on 6/30/89. Your affiant has also found that Daniel Lee Keener's drivers 
license shows the address of 849 North Sir Phillip Drive. Daniel has been arrested for numerous 
thefts including an Aggravated Burglary on 02/26/2000, numerous drug charges (the most recent 
on 05/12/05) and Strong Arm Robbery on 10/05/91. 
Jfour affiant checked police records on Daniel V Keener and showed a picture to Mr. Lambson 
who confirmed that this was the same individual that he/she made contact with while at the listed 
residence. Daniel V Keener has extensive criminal history, some of which includes possession 
of different controlled substances on multiple occasions, thefts, forgeries and assault. 
Narcotic Detectives have conducted surveillance of the residence at 1381 South Emery St and 
observed 2 females leave the listed address and get into Utah listing 160YZK. That vehicle is 
listed to Brian Lybarger. Your affiant checked state records on Brian who has aggravated 
robbery, robbery, multiple thefts, assault, possession of controlled substances, possession of 
weapon and forgery. Your affiant talked with Agent Olive with AP&P who located a Tammy 
Lybarger 1381 South Emery Street who is currently on paper with AP&P. Tammy has carrying 
a concealed weapon, threatening with a weapon, use of a dangerous weapon during a fight, 
carrying concealed weapon, forgeries, possession of meth and other controlled substance charges 
and forgery. 
Your affiant desires to enter 1381 South Emery Street; and search for a Anne Klein watch, a 
Pave diamond ring, a Tiffany necklace with 'Tiffany' inscribed on the necklace and matching 
bracelet, a Omega yellow gold necklace, a diamond yellow gold tennis bracelet, a diamond cross 
*-ti 
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necklace in white gold, turquoise necklace blue with small brown beads, red and silver earrings, 
an antique white gold ring with a pink sapphire stone, a silver and pink ring with cubic zirconias, 
a blue and silver ring with cubic zirconias, and yellow gold diamond stud earrings, clothing, Ipod 
mp3 player, Louis Vuitton bags, 'Mac' makeup, Louis Vuitton sunglasses, among other items on 
attached list 
Your affiant also desired to search Daniel Vem Keener a white male adult D.O.B. 05-19-1954, 
approximately 5' 10" and 190 pounds with grey hair, for the above described property which Mr. 
Lambson observed on the suspect Daniel V Keener. 
This application for search warrant has been reviewed and approved for presentation to the court 
by Deputy District Attorney &)& hr<^ t/' // 5- . 
WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a search wan*ant be issued for the seizure of said items 
anytime day or night because there is reason to believe it is necessary to seize the property prior 
to it being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good reasons to wit: 
The premises which your affiant desires to search is located in a residential community. Your 
affiant has observed children playing in the area near the listed premises during the daylight 
hours. Your affiant has watched the premises during the evening hours and has noted that the 
pedestrian Traffic near the Hsted residence appears to be considerably less during the evening 
hours. Your affiant has observed other residents of the community walking in close proximity to 
the Hsted premises. Your affiant feels that it would be safer for children who may live in the area 
as well as the other residents of the community if the warrant were to be served in the evening 
hours, during a time when children were not present and the pedestrian traffic around the 
grounds seemed to be less. 
Your affiant has also noted that there are businesses in the area of the Hsted residence. These 
businesses are open during the daytime hours and appear to have a large amount of business 
related traffic, which travels in close proximity to the listed address. Your affiant has watched 
the premises during the evening hours and has not noted that there is a decrease in such activity. 
A majority of the businesses in the area are closed during the evening hours. Your affiant feels 
that it would be safer for patrons of the nearby businesses as weU as the other residents of the 
neighborhood if the warrant were to be served in the evening hours, during a time when 
pedestrian traffic around the Hsted premises seemed to be less. 
Your affiant beHeves it is necessary for search teams to get as close as possible to the named 
premises before being discovered because persons involved in an on-going narcotics distribution 
operation wiH attempt to destroy the narcotics if they beHeve the narcotics wiH be discovered by 
law enforcement personnel. Your affiant beHeves the cover of darkness will allow search teams 
to get as close as possible to the premise before being discovered. 
It is further requested that the officer executing the requested search warrant not be required to 
give notice of the officer's authority or purpose because: 
Physical harm may result to any person if notice was given, and/or the property sought may 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
PAGE-5-
quickly be destroyed, disposed of, or secreted. 
This danger is believed to exist because: 
Your affiant has been informed by Mr. Lambson that there is electronic counter-surveillance 
equipment mounted above the doors. Your affiant knows through training and experience that 
this kind of activity is used as a way to forewarn of police action and that person(s) employing 
counter-surveillance are doing so in an attempt to flee or use force to impede officers attempts to 
enter the listed premises or to destroy or conceal contraband 
Your affiant has learned from other Narcotic Detectives that there is active human counter-
surveillance from this address. Occupants have been observed looking out windows and coming 
out the front door and watching up and down the street when vehicles come onto the street. 
The persons living at or otherwise frequenting the listed address are abusing stimulants, namely 
methamphetamine. Your affiant knows through training and experience that persons who use 
stimulants often exhibit unpredictable, paranoid and potentially violent behavior while under the 
influence of the stimulant. Your affiant believes the ability to quickly secure the drug users in 
the listed premises will assist in preventing the physical harm to any person during the execution 
of this warrant. 
Your affiant has found histories on many of those residing at the listed address. Many of these 
criminal histories include, drug related charges, assaults and weapon violations. 
7S?*<£ 
Detective Michael Hardin 
Affiant 
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